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ABSTRACT
The objective of the study is to identify the influence of firms’ internal 
governance mechanisms on the timeliness of management and auditor 
reports. The governance mechanisms examined in this study is Board 
independence, Board size, CEO duality, audit committee meeting and audit 
committee expertise. Data was collected from 264 annual reports of listed 
companies on Bursa Malaysia for a sample period of 2013 to 2014. The 
results showed that a proportion of independent Directors on the Board, 
CEO duality and frequent audit committee meetings had significant effects 
on the timeliness of the reports. The findings indicated that firms’ governance 
mechanisms influence on how fast they were able to release information to 
the users; hence will promote effective communication and maintain their 
accountability to the stakeholders. The result of this study is beneficial to 
the policy makers, company management and stakeholders.
Keywords: timeliness reporting, management report lag, audit report lag, 
internal governance, board structure
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INTrODUCTION
Increasing the complexity of business operations and the growth of the 
investment community requires investors to demand for more relevant and 
more timely information (Vuran & Adiloğlu, 2013). Timeliness is one of 
characteristics of quality information in which it is made available on time 
for decision making. Delay in releasing audited financial statements is a very 
critical factor in emerging and newly developed capital markets because 
the audited financial statements are the only reliable source of information 
available for the investors (Leventis & Weetman, 2004).
Timeliness of financial statements, as discussed by the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (oECD), under the disclosure 
and transparency category is stated below:
“…the corporate governance framework should ensure that 
timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material matters 
regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, 
performance, ownership and governance of the company. 
Disclosure should include, but not be limited to, material 
information on: the financial and operating results of the 
company… information should be prepared and disclosed 
in accordance with high quality standards of accounting 
and financial and non-financial disclosure… channels for 
disseminating information should provide for equal, timely and 
cost efficient access to relevant information by users…”
(oECD, 2004)
Bursa Malaysia Listing requirement under section 9.23 has set out 
that all public listed companies must submit their annual reports to Bursa 
Malaysia within six months after the financial year ends. There are penalty 
charges that will be imposed if the companies fail to fulfil the requirement. 
The purpose is to ensure that the information provided by the audited 
financial statements is useful, reliable and accurate. Further empirical and 
analytical evidence had proven that the timeliness of the financial statements 
has effect on a firm’s value. A study conducted by Edmonds, Edmonds, 
Vermeer and Vermeer (2017) showed that audit delay and post audit delay 
had resulted into higher municipal debt cost and reduced bond rating.
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Many studies on timeliness of financial reporting conducted in 
Malaysia (see: Che-Ahmad & Abidin, 2008; Abidin, Kamal, & Jusoff, 2009; 
Mohamad-nor, Shafie, Wan-hussin, & Building, 2010; Hashim & Abdul 
rahman, 2011; Ismail, Mustapha, & Ming, 2012; Apadore & Mohd Noor, 
2013; Puasa & Ahmad, 2014; Mohammad, 2015), had shown that delays of 
auditor report was commonly the cause of delay in releasing audited financial 
statements. None of the above mentioned prior studies had examined the 
delay from the management part after the auditor report has been signed. It 
is however evident in a study conducted by Al Daoud, Ku Ismail and Lode 
(2015) on Jordanian listed companies as there was a lag period to release 
the published financial statements after it was signed by the auditor.
This study seeks to identify whether corporate governance influences 
the timeliness of financial reports, as measured by audit report lag, 
management report lag and total report lag. The results showed that a 
proportion of independent Board of Directors, CEo duality, audit committee 
meeting and audit committee financial expertise had significant effects 
on the timeliness of the reports. The findings provide useful input to the 
management of the companies and the stakeholders on the important roles 
of corporate governance in providing relevant and reliable information.
The next section discusses previous empirical studies, research 
methods followed by the findings and discussions. The final section 
concludes the paper with limitations of the study and suggestions for future 
research.
LITErATUrE rEVIEW
Corporate Governance and Timeliness of Audited Financial 
reports
In the past ten years theories and practical observations have witnessed 
a dynamic increase in legislation and academic fields relating to corporate 
governance (scott & Gist, 2013). This is due to a growing concern in respect 
to corporate accountability, especially in developed countries, and can 
also be seen by an increasing number of voluntary corporate governance 
guidelines. The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance has set out eight 
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broad principles and 26 recommendations for companies to use as guidance. 
The following are the principles and recommendations in focus:
1. Establishing a strong foundation for the Board and its committees to 
carry out their roles effectively
2. Promoting timely and balanced disclosure
3. Safeguarding the integrity of financial reporting
4. Emphasising the importance of risk management and internal controls
5. Encouraging shareholders’ participation in general meetings
Based on the new principles and recommendations above, in order 
to achieve this objective, all the Board members must control and monitor 
the management consistently. This is because the mechanisms of corporate 
governance itself will improve the monitoring of management and minimise 
any erroneous and mismanagement of financial reporting delays (Afify, 
2009; Parnes & Parnes, 2011). Moreover, corporate governance is also 
considered as a mechanism that can influence the quality of information 
(Mohamad-nor et al., 2010; Klai & omri, 2011). Therefore, by having good 
corporate governance, it can help auditors to produce audited reports in a 
timely manner. In other words, a “special” relationship exists between the 
timeliness of financial reports and corporate governance characteristics. 
Therefore, it indicates that having corporate governance is very important as 
it can promote the timeliness of financial reporting (Sharar, 2006). Previous 
studies conducted by professional and regulatory bodies in Malaysia showed 
that corporate governance is significantly related to the audit report lag in 
which it has become the limelight in investigating the factors that affect 
audit report lag (Afify, 2009).
The OECD defines corporate governance as follows:  “Corporate 
governance involves a set of relationships between its board, company’s 
management, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance 
also provides the structure which the objectives of the company are set, and 
the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are 
determined.”(oECD, 2004a: 38).
The adoption of corporate governance mechanisms in firms is 
one of the indicators that firms are concerned in reducing the agency 
conflict, particularly when governance “takes care” of the best interests 
MAR June 2017.indd   216 12/15/2017   9:14:51 AM
217
The Relevance of InTeRnal GoveRnance MechanIsMs
of all shareholders (Al Daoud et al., 2015). A well functioning corporate 
governance structure can improve the monitoring of management and at the 
same time be able to minimise erroneous reporting and controls managers’ 
misbehaviours (Afify, 2009).  Furthermore, effective corporate governance 
should enhance internal control and mitigate business risks, which would 
influence shorter audit delay (Alwi, Gajah, Adibah, Ismail, & Kamarudin, 
2013). The conflict of interest between the agent and principal discussed in 
the agency theory emphasised the needs to reduce information gap between 
the insiders and outsiders of the organisation (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). It 
was argued that independent Board Directors, separation of CEo-Chairman 
roles, small Board size, financial expertise in audit committee, and frequent 
audit committee meetings are among attributes of strong governance; and 
hence were investigated in this study.
Most studies on Malaysian samples were focused on the audit report 
lag. Therefore, this study provides an extension to the literature by employing 
three measures of timeliness, namely audit report lag, management report 
lag, and total report lag. figure 1 depicts the research framework of this 
study. The corporate governance mechanisms examined in this study is 
Board independence, CEo duality, Board size, audit committee expertise 
and audit committee meeting.
Board Independence and Timeliness reports
The independent non-executive Directors are more helpful for the 
Board to reduce the frequency of misstatement and fraud in financial 
statements as they have the right set of skills and are viewed as more 
effective in monitoring management behaviour than inside Directors 
(shukeri & Islam, 2012). Independent non-executive Directors who have 
no business interfering with the exercise of an independent judgment are 
viewed to be better in monitoring and controlling as compared to Directors 
in companies (Ibadin, 2012). Braswell, Daniels, Landis and Chang (2012) 
found that independent Boards indicated strong governance mechanisms, 
and such boards have a higher tendency to motivate management through 
their monitoring. Therefore, because of their high degree of impartiality, 
these independent boards are believed to be willing guardians and protectors 
of the shareholders’ interest via their control and monitoring (Zaitul, 
2010). It indicated that the more independent the board is, the better the 
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company control is and this can reduce their audit business risks because 
of less conflict between managers and shareholders. When there are more 
independent directors on board, both managers and shareholders will 
be treated equally. It is related to the agency theory concept, where the 
shareholders believe that the managers of the companies will act in their 
best ofinterests.
Yacob and Che-Ahmad (2012) identified a positive relationship 
between frs 138 adoption and audit report lag, suggesting that Ifrs 
complexity had caused auditors to spend more time on the audit work. 
They reported that the maximum days taken by the auditors were 364 days 
with an average of 101 days. shukeri and Islam (2012) who observed 491 
companies’ annual reports from Bursa Malaysia,  found that audit report lag 
was influenced by audit opinion, total assets, auditor type, firm profitability, 
audit committee size and audit committee meetings. revision on the MCCG 
2007 had improved the audit report lag as evident by Puasa and Ahmad 
(2014), suggesting that improvement on the guidelines had increased 
the effectiveness of the governance structure employed in the firms, and 
ultimately improve the timeliness of the report. Existing evidence on the 
influence of independent Boards on report timeliness is mixed. Afify (2009), 
Mohamad-nor et al. (2010), Hashim and Abdul rahman (2011) and Al 
Daoud et al. (2015) found that independent Boards increase the timeliness 
of audit reports. Insignificant results were obtained by Ibadin (2012) and 
shukeri and Islam (2012), while Apadore and Mohd Noor (2013) found that 
Board independence had reduced timeliness of audit report. The following 
hypothesis was tested:
H1: Board independence is negatively associated with the timeliness of 
financial reporting.
CEO Duality and Timeliness reports
According to the agency theory, the positions of CEo and Chairman 
should be separated as the responsibility of the Chairman is to oversee the 
CEo of the Board and control the management. In addition, the agency theory 
also states that CEO duality might impair the value and firm performance 
as this duality role could prevent the Board from properly monitoring the 
work of the CEo (Hill & Jones, 1992). The theory recommends separation 
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of role as CEO and Chairman as this separation may increase the efficiency 
of monitoring the company’s corporate governance. Good corporate 
governance leads to more transparency and better corporate disclosure in 
less developed markets (Betah, 2013). A study by forker (1992) found that 
the same person holding the CEo and Chairman positions will tend to be a 
threat for the quality of information disclosure because both positions have 
different roles. Therefore, the combination of these two roles will have a 
negative impact, especially on the shareholders’ wealth. separation of the 
positions of CEO and Chairman is very important as it can avoid conflicts 
of interest between CEo and Chairman (Jensen, 1993).
Abdullah (2006), Abdelsalam and street (2007) and Mohamad-nor 
et al. (2010) found that separating the CEo-Chairman roles had improved 
timeliness of Internet reporting and audit report lag. Mouna and Anis (2013) 
however found that, CEo duality was associated with slower timing of 
published financial statements. The following hypothesis was tested:
H2: CEO Duality is negatively associated with the timeliness of financial 
reporting.
Board Size and Timeliness reports
over the years, the Board size has always been a topic of discussion in 
the workplace. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) suggested that 
firms should not appoint too many Directors in  the Board and suggested 
a maximum of seven or eight Directors.  It was argued that a large Board 
tends to involve in less meaningful discussions since too many Directors 
are involved in the discussion, making it both time consuming and difficult 
to achieve cohesiveness. Contradicting with the unfavourable effect of a 
large Board, Klai and Omri (2011) found a significant positive relationship 
between Board size and financial reporting quality in Tunisian companies. 
similarly Abidin et al. (2009) reported that a larger Board size contributes 
more to company performance because there are more ideas and skills of 
Board members that can be shared between them. There is no conclusive 
result on the effect of Board size on timeliness. Mohamad-Nor et al. (2010), 
Eslami, Armin and Jaz (2015) and Hassan (2016) found that an increase in 
Board size was associated with an increase in audit report lag. Conversely, 
sakka and Jarboui (2016) found that an increase in Board size will reduce 
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audit report lag and will also delay the management report. Chalaki, Didar 
and riahinezhad (2012) however, found no association. following Lipton 
and Lorsch’s (1992) argument, the following hypothesis was tested:
H3: Board size is negatively associated with the timeliness of financial 
reporting.
Audit Committee Meeting and Timeliness of reports
frequency of audit committee meetings can also help companies 
produce audit reports on a timely basis. 
“The revised Code increases the frequency of meetings between 
the audit committee and the external auditor without the 
executive board members present. This encourages a greater 
exchange of free and honest views and opinions between both 
parties.” 
(MCCG, 2016:4)
from the above statements, it indicated that the Audit Committee 
should meet regularly, with due notice of issues to be discussed, and 
its conclusions recorded in discharging its duties and responsibilities. 
Mohamad-nor et al. (2010) revealed that more active and larger Audit 
Committee members will also shorten the audit timeliness and at the same 
time, an effective audit committee may enhance the credibility and quality 
of audited financial statements (Al Daoud et al., 2015). However, a study by 
Yadirichukwu and Ebimobowei (2013) found that audit committee meetings 
are not significantly related to timeliness of financial reports.  The following 
hypothesis was tested:
H4: Audit Committee meeting is negatively associated with the timeliness 
of financial reporting.
Audit Committee Expertise and Timeliness reports
Audit Committee plays an important role in monitoring the financial 
reporting process since its fundamental responsibilities is to oversee 
financial reporting procedures, the internal and external audit process and 
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risk management practice, and the internal control system of the company. 
Audit Committee members that have financial expertise are able to improve 
the quality of the financial statements as they are obliged to monitor both 
internal and external auditors and the integrity of financial statements, 
which then result in lower audit delay (rochmah Ika & Mohd Ghazali, 
2012; Mohammad, 2015; Al Daoud et al., 2015).
Hashim and Abdul rahman (2011) found that the Audit Committee 
expertise and Audit Committee independence could assist in reducing audit 
report lag among Malaysian companies. The findings of Yadirichukwu and 
Ebimobowei (2013) showed that audit committee expertise was associated 
with better timeliness of financial reports. According to Mohammad (2015), 
audit committee members with special expertise may help companies to 
balance divergent views of external auditors and management and hence 
reduce the time taken to publish the financial statements.  The following 
hypothesis was tested:
H5: Audit Committee expertise is negatively associated with the timeliness 
of financial reporting.
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The sample period of this study was between 2013 and 2014 and the sample companies were 
selected based on the market capitalisation of listed companies on Bursa Malaysia. The best practice 
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data on the governance variables and the time taken by the company to submit the audit report and 
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During the sample period, a total of 356 companies on the main Board of Bursa Malaysia, based on 
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this study (refer Table 3.1).  Finance related companies were excluded as those industries were 
subjected to different rules and regulations, and are closely monitored by the regulators with respect 
to financial reporting (Al Daoud et al., 2015). 
This study examined three dependent variables, namely audit report lag (ARL), management report 
lag (MRL) and total report lag (TRL). Figure 2 illustratesthe computations .  The explanation on the 
computation is  presented in Table 3.2. The independent variables are Board independence (BIND), 
CEO duality (CEOD), Board size (BSIZ), Audit Committee expertise (ACE), and frequency of Audit 
Committee meetings (ACM). The control variables adopted in this study are company size (COSIZ), 
audit firm size (AUDSIZ) and profitability (PROF). The measurements of the variables are presented 
in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.1: Distribution of sample 
Industries 2013 2014 
 
     
H1 
H2 
H3 H4 
H5 
Board
Independence
CEO Duality Board Size
Audit 
Committee 
Meeting
Audit 
Committee 
Expertise
Timeliness Reports:
1)  Audit Report Lag (ARL)
2)  Management Report Lag (MRL)
3)  Total Report Lag (TRL)
figure 1: research framework
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METHODOLOGY
The sample period of this study was between 2013 and 2014 and the 
sample companies were selected based on the market capitalisation of listed 
companies on Bursa Malaysia. The best practice of corporate governance 
guidelines was revised in 2012, thus this study intends to identify if 
corporate governance influences the timeliness of the reports, upon the 
revised structure. This study collected data on the governance variables and 
the time taken by the company to submit the audit report and management 
report, from the annual reports. The annual reports were downloaded from 
the Bursa Malaysia website. 
During the sample period, a total of 356 companies on the main Board 
of Bursa Malaysia, based on market capitalisation from nine industries. 
However, only 264 companies were selected as samples of this study (refer 
Table 1).  finance related companies were excluded as those industries were 
subjected to different rules and regulations, and are closely monitored by 
the regulators with respect to financial reporting (Al Daoud et al., 2015).
This study examined three dependent variables, namely audit report 
lag (ArL), management report lag (MrL) and total report lag (TrL). 
figure 2 illustratesthe computations .  The explanation on the computation 
is  presented in Table 2. The independent variables are Board independence 
(BIND), CEo duality (CEoD), Board size (BsIZ), Audit Committee 
expertise (ACE), and frequency of Audit Committee meetings (ACM). The 
control variables adopted in this study are company size (CosIZ), audit 
firm size (AUDSIZ) and profitability (PROF). The measurements of the 
variables are presented in Table 2.
Table 1: Distribution of Sample
Industries 2013 2014
Consumer Goods 34 34
Industrials 32 32
Consumer Services 24 24
Oil and Gas 14 14
Healthcare 8 8
Basic Material 6 6
Utilities 6 6
Telecommunications 5 5
Technology 4 4
Total 132 132
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Figure 2: Illustration on the Measurements of the Dependant Variables
This study adopted three regression models as shown below. 
The models were run by using SPSS to test whether the firms’ internal 
governance structure has significant influence on the timeliness of reports.
Model 1 - Audit report Lag 
 ArLi,t = β0 + β1BINDi,t + β2CEoDi,t + β3BsIZi,t + β4ACMi,t + β5ACEi,t 
+ β6CosIZi,t + β7AUDsIZi,t + β8Profi,t + εi,t   
Model 2 - Management report Lag 
 MrLi,t = β0 + β1BINDi,t + β2CEoDi,t + β3BsIZi,t + β4ACMi,t + β5ACEi,t 
+ β6CosIZi,t + β7AUDsIZi,t + β8Profi,t + εi,t    
 
 Model 3 - Total report Lag (TrL) 
 
 TrLi,t = β0 + β1BINDi,t + β2CEoDi,t + β3BsIZi,t + β4ACMi,t + β5ACEi,t + 
β6CosIZi,t + β7AU sIZi,t + β8Profi,t + εi,t    
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Table 2: Measurement of Variables
Variable Measurement
Dependent variables
ARL Number of days from date of financial year end (FYED) to the date of 
auditor sign the audit report (ARD).
[ARL = ARD – FYED]
MRL Number of days from date of auditor sign the audit report (ARD) to the 
date financial statement publish (FSP) to the public 
[MRL = FSP – ARD]
TRL Number of days from date of financial year end (FYED) to the date 
financial statement publish (FSP) to the public 
[TRL = FSP – FYED]
Independent variables 
 BIND number of independent directors  ÷  total number of board members
CEOD Dummy variables coded: 1 if CEO-Chairman roles combine; 0 if separate
BSIZ Total board members
ACM Total number of audit committee meeting held in the financial year
ACE Total number of audit committee member qualified members accounting 
professional bodies
Control variables
COSIZ Natural logarithm of total assets
AUDSIZ Dummy variables coded: 1 if big-four auditors;  0 if otherwise
PROF Dummy variable coded: 1 if profit making company; 0 if loss making 
company
rESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive Results
Based on Table 3, the average days taken by the sample companies 
to produce their audit report (ArL) was 87 days. The time taken is not far 
different from companies in other countries, for instance, 83 days taken 
by Tehran stock Exchange (TsE) companies in 2002-2010 (Banimahd, 
Moradzadehfard & Zeynali, 2012); 84 days for Chinese listed companies 
(Li et al., 2014) and 84.7 days, 78.8 days and 65.8 days taken by companies 
in the republic of China, European Union (EU) and the UsA, respectively 
(Mcgee & Yuan, 2012).
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent, 
Independent and Control Variables
N Min Max Mean
Dependent Variables
ARL 264 37 122 87.45
MRL 264 5 100 36.76
TRL  264 57 185 124.22
Independent Variables
BIND 264 0.00 0.83 0.38
BSIZ 264 4 16 8.87
ACM 264 2 6 3.59
ACE 264 0.00 1.00 0.38
Control Variable
COSIZ 264 8 11 9.23
Dummy variables
CEOD:
- Separated = 92%
- Combined = 8%
AUDSIZ:
- Big-4 = 87.5%
- Others = 12.5%
PROF:
- Profit making= 94.7%
- Loss making = 5.3%
The longest time taken to complete the audit report was 122 days, 
which was below the mandatory requirement of 180 days by Bursa 
Malaysia’s Listing requirements.  The shortest time taken to produce the 
audit report was 37 days, but it was relatively higher than those found for 
Jordanians firms, which was 18 days (AL Daoud et al, 2015) and 8 days 
for Nigeria stock Exchange companies (onwuchekwa & Dibia, 2013). 
Various factors may have contributed to audit report delay; one that may 
cause this case is possibly due to the fact that the financial year end falls 
within the peak period of external auditors. According to Raja Ahmad 
and Kamarudin (2003), 31 December is a common financial year end for 
Malaysian companies and therefore auditors are expected to perform audit 
work on many companies. This study found that more than half of the sample 
companies’ (65%) financial year ended on 31 December. Furthermore, 87% 
of the sample companies were audited by the big-four auditors that may 
have caused scheduling problem to the auditors (Carslaw & Kaplan, 1991; 
Che-Ahmad & Abidin, 2008).
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The average time taken in producing a management report (MrL) 
was 36 days, closely to 34.54 days as reported by Al Daoud et al. (2015) 
for Jordanian companies. The time taken is reasonably below than that 
reported by Nour and Al-fadel (2006) was 69 days in 2001 and 58 days 
in 2002; and 91.79 days found in oladipupo and Izendomi (2013). This 
indicates that Malaysian companies are timelier in producing its financial 
statements to the public. The shortest day to produce the management 
report was an impressive 5 days; and surprisingly there were companies that 
took a longer time, i.e. 100 days to release the financial statements to the 
public from the date of the signature on the auditor’s report. oladipupo and 
Izendomi (2013) argued that the delays may be due to the longer time taken 
in organising the Annual General Meetings before the financial statements 
can be released to the public.
On average, the sample companies fulfil the six- month period given 
by the Bursa Malaysia listing requirement; as the mean days taken to 
publish audited financial statements (TRL) after the financial year ends 
was 124 days. some sample companies took only 57 days, and there were 
companies that exceeded the time limit. Plausibly the background of the 
company has some influence on the timeliness of the reports. For instance, 
construction companies have many projects, thus the auditor might take 
a longer time in performing their audit works. Relative to the findings of 
Amitabh (2005), the mean value for the total report lag was 255 days, 
indicating that Malaysian companies have done their best to comply with 
the requirement of Bursa Malaysia.
Empirical results and Discussions
The results on the influence of the internal governance on the timeliness 
of the reports are presented in Table 4.2. The ArL, MrL and TrL models 
of this study were all significant at 1% level. Therefore, the models adopted 
in this study were significantly influenced by the variations of firms’ internal 
governance and firm attributes.
It was found that a higher proportion of independent Directors on 
the Board was inversely associated with audit report lag and total report 
lag, thus it supports H1.The result was consistent with Afify (2009) and 
Zaitul’s (2010) studies which found that a greater number of independent 
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Board members will reduce the time taken to prepare the audited financial 
statements. The results imply that independent Directors are a strong 
governance tool to promote timelier reporting.  supporting H2, separating 
the roles of CEo and chairman was associated with timelier management 
report lag, at 10% significant level. It suggests that if the CEO and Chairman 
of the Board  are different persons, it will take a shorter time to publish 
the financial statements upon the audit report signed by the auditor. It is 
presumed that the CEo holds fewer tasks when he is not the Chairman 
of the Board, thus he can focus on the process of publishing the financial 
statements. The duality roles have no effect on the timeliness of the auditor’s 
report. H3 was rejected as the Board size had no significant influence on any 
of the models, implying that timeliness of reporting was not affected by the 
number of the Board members. This result contradicted with Al Daoud et 
al. (2015) who found that larger Boards would increase the ArL and MrL; 
and Abidin et al. (2009) who found that a larger Board size would increase 
company performance as a whole and reduce the number of audit delay. 
No conclusive evidence is drawn from the mixed results.
Audit committee meeting was found to be positively associated 
with management report lag at 5% significance level, rejecting a negative 
relationship in H4.  Though it was expected that frequent meetings lead 
to timelier reporting because audit committee members are active; the 
results here suggest that frequent meetings have led to a longer time taken 
to produce management reports. Arguably it was due to the ineffective 
conduct of meetings, whereby the same unresolved issue was discussed in 
meeting and delays the reporting. Audit Committee expertise was found 
inversely related to management report lag, thus supports H5. The result 
was consistent with Mohamad-nor et al. (2010) and Hashim and Abdul 
rahman (2011) who found that having Audit Committee expertise in the 
companies will help the management to have better understanding about 
financial statements. Therefore, it may lead to a better control of making 
corrections after auditors had audited the financial statements. 
The overall findings showed that different governance tools effectively 
influence different forms of report; and the strongest tool was the independent 
Directors in ensuring that the published financial statements is released to the 
public in a short time. from another perspective, other corporate governance 
characteristics examined in this study had no effect on the timeliness of audit 
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reports, probably not because they were not effective but there are other 
factors that had more direct effect on the audit report, such as presented by 
Turel (2016); that loss making firms or firms that received qualified audit 
reports tend to delay the bad news to the public. 
Table 4: Multiple Regression Analysis on Audit Report Lag (ARL), 
Management report Lag (MrL) and Total report Lag (TrL)
ArL MrL TrL
Variables Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
(Constant) 193.063 7.630 2.411 .121 195.475 8.432
BIND -25.580*** -3.129 3.182 .493 -22.398*** -2.991
CEOD -.799 -.139 7.487* 1.654 6.688 1.272
BSIZ -.178 -.252 -.012 -.022 -.190 -.294
ACM -1.096 -.557 3.092** 1.994 1.996 1.108
ACE 9.152 1.033 -12.756* -1.801 -3.424 -.422
COSIZ -6.542** -2.564 1.083 .538 -5.459** -2.336
AUDSIZ -12.002* -2.607 8.050** 2.217 -3.952 -.937
PROF -24.168*** -3.563 9.908* 1.852 -14.260** -2.294
N 264 264 264
Adjusted R Square .132 .057 .073
R Square .158 .085 .101
F-value 5.993*** 2.979*** 3.575***
***p< 0.01; **p< 0.05; *p<0.10 
CONCLUSION
This study provides empirical evidence on the effects of corporate 
governance mechanisms (Board independence, CEo duality, Board size, 
Audit Committee expertise and Audit Committee meeting) on the timeliness 
of financial reports of Malaysian listed companies.  Descriptive analysis 
on time taken to produce audit reports and publish financial statements 
suggested that the sample companies comply with the Bursa Malaysia 
listing requirement.  Nevertheless, this study highlights that the average time 
taken by auditors to produce an audit report was longer than those of the 
management report. It implies that the delay in releasing publish financial 
statements was consumed mostly by the audit work.
MAR June 2017.indd   228 12/15/2017   9:14:52 AM
229
The Relevance of InTeRnal GoveRnance MechanIsMs
The results reported that corporate governance plays an important 
role in reducing audited financial statements lag. Independent Directors 
are a strong governance tool for timelier reports; however frequent Audit 
Committee meetings do not portray quality and effective discussions in 
the meeting. splitting the roles of the CEo and Chairman of the Board 
is important for timelier management report. More effort is needed to 
strengthen firms’ governance structure so that Malaysian listed companies 
are able to produce quality audited financial statements on a timely basis. 
Time taken to produce the audit report relies on the auditor, but a company 
that has an effective function of independent Directors is able to shorten the 
time. In general, this study showed that corporate governance determines 
timelier financial reporting. However, the findings seem to suggest that, 
except for independent Directors, other mechanisms examined in this study 
were not effective to influence a faster release of the audit report.
This study suffers with limitation; firstly the sample period was two 
years, which may capture the minimal effects of corporate governance 
attributes to the timeliness of financial reports. Secondly, this study examined 
264 companies based on market capitalisation. Testing on a broader sample 
size with a longer period of study may provide a different conclusion. other 
mechanisms such as board diligence, board ownership, audit committee 
independence and compensation committee are also subjects of interest.
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